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Abstract This article provides a first step towards a better theoretical and empirical
knowledge of the emerging arena of transnational climate governance. The need for such a
re-conceptualization emerges from the increasing relevance of non-state and transnational
approaches towards climate change mitigation at a time when the intergovernmental
negotiation process has to overcome substantial stalemate and the international arena
becomes increasingly fragmented. Based on a brief discussion of the increasing trend
towards transnationalization and functional segmentation of the global climate governance
arena, we argue that a remapping of climate governance is necessary and needs to take into
account different spheres of authority beyond the public and international. Hence, we
provide a brief analysis of how the public/private divide has been conceptualized in
Political Science and International Relations. Subsequently, we analyse the emerging
transnational climate governance arena. Analytically, we distinguish between different
manifestations of transnational climate governance on a continuum ranging from delegated
and shared public–private authority to fully non-state and private responses to the climate
problem. We suggest that our remapping exercise presented in this article can be a useful
starting point for future research on the role and relevance of transnational approaches to
the global climate crisis.
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1 Introduction
Scientific evidence indicates with increasing certainty that current changes in the earth’s
climate system are happening as a result of human agency, and that they are taking place at
an accelerated pace (IPCC 2007; Stern 2007). While the problem of anthropogenic climate
change is gaining renewed attention in the media and the wider public,1 the institutional
architecture in place seems to be rather incapable of effectively addressing climate change.
Within this context, the scientific community has so far not sufficiently reflected on one of
the major trends in global environmental governance that increasingly gains relevance for
global climate politics: the transnationalization of environmental governance (cf. Bier-
mann and Pattberg 2008). The current transnationalization of global climate governance
can be observed in phenomena such as private standard-setting initiatives for the carbon
market (e.g. the Gold Standard), public–private governance networks that implement
internationally agreed outcomes such as the Millennium Development Goals (e.g. The
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership), public non-state networks that
focus on mitigation (e.g. C40, a recent initiative of 40 global cities to curb their greenhouse
gas emissions) and private networks that attempt to govern the climate arena through
information disclosure and public awareness (e.g. the Carbon Disclosure Project).2
More systematically, the transnationalization3 of climate governance refers to at least
five empirical observations. First, global climate governance is marked by a proliferation
of policies, such as the emissions trading system of the European Union (EU), the target-
and-timetables approach of the Kyoto Protocol, the voluntary Asia-Pacific Partnership on
Clean Development and Climate (APP) (van Asselt 2007), independent initiatives taken by
some U.S. states, and the fast-growing voluntary carbon market. Second, global climate
governance is marked by a mosaic of actors, including governments, civil society, science,
business, and public non-state actors such as cities, and their interlinked political activities
in this field.4 Third, and as a consequence, global climate governance is marked by
divergent polities and principles on how the overall architecture of climate governance
should be structured: While some nations hope to maintain a universal approach towards
climate governance, others seemingly work towards new forms of a more fragmented
and flexible order that places more emphasis on hybrid and private mitigation policies
(Biermann et al. 2007c). Fourth, and related to the above, the emerging carbon market is
1 A 2006 poll in the US for example shows that nearly three out of every four individuals—74%—are more
convinced today that global warming is a reality than they were two years before. See
http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1161.
2 By stressing the current trend towards transnationalization in global climate governance, we do not
stipulate that transnationalization in general is a novel trend in world politics. We position the current debate
within the long-standing scholarly discussion on transnational politics in Sect. 2.
3 We broadly define transnationalization as a deepening and broadening of interactions, processes, and
institutions that cross national boundaries and include non-state actors. On this account, a change in policies,
institutional arrangements and the underlying norms is regarded as transnationalization as long as it includes
non-state actors and has a boundary-spanning dimension. This understanding is in line with recent schol-
arship on the transnationalization of environmental politics (Pattberg 2005, 2007).
4 This functional multiplication of actors extends to governments, where we can distinguish at least three
different groups: industrialized countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and committed to limit their
greenhouse gas emissions by an average of 5% by 2012; industrialized countries that reject Kyoto, but
intend to develop alternative regulatory approaches and architectures of international cooperation; and
developing countries that support Kyoto in principle, and have ratified it, but do not need to limit or reduce
their emissions within the first commitment period.
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now increasingly fragmented, but with many interconnections. An important distinction
can be made between compliance (or mandatory) markets and voluntary markets. Further,
there are two major types of transactions of emissions reduction credits taking place:
allowance-based transactions and project-based transactions. The former refers to the
trading of issued allowances created and allocated by regulators under a cap-and-trade
regime and in the latter are emission credits the result of a specific project in a baseline-
and-credit system.
Finally, global climate governance is marked by a multiplication of functional inter-
linkages and communication channels, apparent in the observation that the future of global
climate governance is currently negotiated in different and often non-synchronized dis-
cussion fora. While, for example, the future of the current climate regime and, in particular,
its Kyoto Protocol is negotiated in the open-ended ad hoc working group (AWG), estab-
lished at the first COP/MOP in 2005, the larger convention dialogue on ‘‘long-term
cooperative action to address climate change’’ and the seminar of government experts’
(SOGE) current discussion on reducing deforestation in developing countries, other future
strategies are discussed within the Gleneagles G8 plus 5 process, the Major Economies
Meeting initiated by the U.S. Administration, and the APP.5 In addition, the crucial role of
business and other non-state actors in mitigating climate change is rarely reflected in the
international negotiations.
In light of this growing complexity of global climate policy, we argue that an expansion
of our analytical toolkit is both necessary and rewarding. We contend that the predominant
perspective on global climate governance is biased and incomplete as it takes into account
only the international arena of interstate negotiations, public policies and those non-state
actors that try to influence international agreements. However, current developments in
global climate governance are signs of the gradual institutionalization of a transnational
public sphere in world politics, where the establishment of norms and rules and their
subsequent implementation are only to a limited extent the result of public agency in the
formal sense, but often the outcome of agency beyond the state.6 Therefore, a more
detailed mapping of the actors, mechanisms and systems of rules beyond the interstate
system is necessary to appraise all potential options for an effective and equitable future
global climate governance architecture.
We proceed in three steps. First, we provide a critical re-conceptualization of the public/
private distinction in International Relations (IR) theory. Subsequently, we attempt a re-
mapping of global climate governance by focusing on agency and architecture beyond the
state. Empirically, we offer an overview of transnational approaches towards global cli-
mate governance, including governance through markets and governance through
networks. Our cases are illustrations of our conceptual framework rather than an all-
encompassing mapping of the field. Finally, we conclude with some lessons learned and a
number of questions for future research in the field of transnational climate governance.
2 The public and the private ‘divide’
The distinction between the public and the private is a crucial ordering device in social life
and it continues to shape much of the current debates surrounding various forms of
5 On the related concept of environmental regime conflicts, see Zelli (2005).
6 For an argument about the relevance of climate governance beyond the state, see Jagers and Stripple
(2003; Paterson and Stripple 2007).
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governance. The following sections provide a brief portrayal of how the public and private
have been conceptualized in the political science literature and indicate how it might be
rethought. We will specifically sketch how the discipline of IR has historically worked with
a rather crude approach to the public/private divide that is a direct result of its statist point
of departure. However, there have been some significant reorientations in the literature that
enable a less statist and more comprehensive remapping of global politics. While it is
common to refer to a ‘divide’ or a ‘gap’ between the public and the private, such
dichotomous thinking actually turns out to be not necessarily wrong but rather unhelpful
when it comes to understanding how authority is being articulated and how governance is
shaped through non-state actors in issue areas such as climate change.
2.1 The public and the private in political theory
In political theory the legacy of the Polis is pervasive. The Polis is the ancient Greek term
for the city-state and refers to a rather small entity, independently governed, and composed
of both rural and urban areas. There was only one city for each Polis and the members of
the community, the citizens, identified themselves with common religion, language and
costumes. The Greek word Politeia (government), derived from the term Polis, was used to
describe the way city-states were ruled. It was Hanna Arendt who, with The Human
Condition (1958), drew attention to the separation of Greek life into two realms: a public
(the Polis) and a private (the household). Arendt, in a classic formulation, uses the Polis
metaphorically and states that the Polis
‘‘is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it
arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people
living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be’’ (Arendt 1958, p.
198).
Beacroft underscores the centrality of Arendt’s thinking for our conceptualization of
politics: the ‘‘Greek model of the Polis remains relevant to political theory as it highlights
the centrality of the public realm for political life as a way of speaking, acting and living
between human beings’’ (Beacroft 2007, p. 42). For IR specifically, the equation of the
public, the state and the territory has had fundamental implications for how we think of
authority and governance. Authority, that is legitimate power, has been understood to exist
only inside the Polis and, hence, outside the territory/state/public power has been con-
sidered ‘illegitimate’. It has therefore been difficult for IR to come to terms with non-state
actors as a legitimate form of agency ‘beyond the state’ in world politics.
While political analysis and commentaries are accustomed to use the public (the state)
and the private (the market) in a specific way, these concepts are more contested than
usually acknowledged. In two essays, Bailey (2000, 2002) provides an historical overview
of the public/private divide and shows that there is no essential ‘private’ or genuinely
‘public’. In ancient Greek civilization the public was the sphere of freedom and decision.
Later on, Roman imperial and republican conceptualizations shifted the focus of the public
from shared deliberation to absolute sovereignty. However, in any case, the private was
merely residual and it was the public that was privileged as idea, concern and project.
During the Middle Ages and the period of feudalism the public/private distinction faded.
Kinship and networks of personal dependency made both the public and the private
irrelevant as categories. However, the public/private distinction made a comeback with the
rise of modernity and civil society, and through ideas such as sovereignty and citizenship.
In a comprehensive fashion, Bailey (2002, p. 19) argues that
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‘‘the rise of bourgeois civil society, the spread of market-based social relations and
legal-rational capitalism, and the growth of political representation and political
democracy in the West all marked the next stages for change in the meanings of the
public and private’’.
Throughout history, the content and location of the private and the public has not been
fixed. The private can refer to, inter alia, the family, the domestic, the personal, friendship
and the self, while the public can refer to the state, civil society, the market and com-
munity. Hence, what is important here is that Bailey adopts an understanding of the public,
not as that which is ‘the state’, but as that which is ‘collective’. Collective actors derived
from civil society, the market and various communities become effectively public with a
potential to govern people and issues. As we will see in a moment, this is an accord that
harmonizes with recent writings on the public and private in world politics.
2.2 Public and private authority in world politics
Within the discipline of IR, by and large, the public has been equal to the state and the
private has been equal to the non-state. The role of non-state actors was attracting scholarly
interest in the early 1970s (e.g. Keohane and Nye 1972). The predominant focus of these
studies was to account for the influence of non-state actors (mostly multinational corpo-
rations) on state behaviour in various issue areas. Keohane and Nye (1977) have later
developed the theoretical model of ‘‘complex interdependence’’, which portrays a world
where transnational activity affects the states’ capacity to act, where the distinction
between ‘high’ (security) and ‘low’ (trade) politics is obsolete, and where military force is
seen, by and large, as ineffective.
By the mid-1980s, institutionalist thinking had shifted towards a functional theory of
regimes (Keohane 1984) that could account for patterns of international cooperation (or
the lack thereof). This theory provided the opportunity for Realism and Liberalism to
unite in a shared ‘rationalist’ research programme that was premised on the condition of
anarchy in the international system (i.e. authority seen as divided and separated terri-
torially) and oriented towards investigating the conditions for international cooperation.
This perspective became also influential for the way research on global environmental
politics came to be conceptualized and it still continues to shape and inspire research in
the field.7
In a broad (critical) reflection on the regime approach to global environmental issues,
Conca (2006, p. 21) argues that
‘‘simply put, regimes are the vehicles of states. Because a codified international
agreement lies at the heart of most processes of regime building, regimes internalize
strong presumptions about state authority, the legitimacy of state actions, and the
essential difference between governments and other collective agents.’’
Therefore, given that global climate governance is increasingly transnationalizing, there
is an urgent need to reconsider climate governance with regard to questions of authority.
Starting from a similar position, James Rosenau has emphasized the role of non-state
actors and authority in world politics rather differently. Stressing that ‘‘governance without
government’’ is present in many issue areas, Rosenau (1997) concluded that degrees of
7 For a recent example see Breitmeier et al. (2006).
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order are achieved through regime-building efforts and other rule-making activities
without the presence of a state or a formal intergovernmental institution. The emergence of
such new authority structures led Rosenau to identify two (separate) political worlds, one
‘state-centric’ consisting of ‘sovereignty-bound states’ and the other ‘multi-centric’ con-
sisting of ‘sovereignty-free’ actors. As a result, Rosenau tries to account for non-state
actors as more generic ‘spheres of authority’. Consequently, Rosenau (1997, p. 39)
understands these spheres of authority as the building blocks of a new ontology where
states are treated as only one of the many sources of authority.
In a similar vein, but with less focus on novelty and instead with a view on historic
continuity, Ferguson and Mansbach (1996, 2004) have provided a comprehensive re-
mapping of global politics in which authority is fragmented among polities with little
hierarchical arrangement among them.
The shift in conceptualizing authority in world politics is most pronounced in two edited
books, Private Authority in International Affairs (Cutler et al. 1999) and Private Authority
in Global Governance (Hall and Biersteker 2002a). Hall and Biersteker contend that
traditional approaches to international politics regard states not only as the principal actors,
but also as the only legitimate actors. They argue that the equation of authority with
government has for too long constrained an analysis of other forms of authority. But, in
fact, the public does not need to equal the government:
‘‘Being public does not, however, imply that a state or public institution must be
involved or wielding authority, even though they might participate in recognizing it
in certain situations. It does, however, imply that the social recognition of authority
should be publicly expressed. This opens the possibility for the emergence of private,
non-state based, or non-state legitimated authority’’ (Hall and Biersteker 2002b,
p. 5).
Hence, the distinction between the state as the public domain and the non-state as the
private domain is neither a helpful guide to where to find, and not to find, authority nor
does it allow to make any claims about where authority should, or should not, be located. It
seems now rather obvious that increasingly norms, rules, roles and responsibilities are
becoming institutionalized beyond the confines of the state and the international society
they construct. As Ruggie (2004, p. 521) has argued,
‘‘the arena in which ‘the authoritative allocation of values in societies’ now takes
place increasingly reaches beyond the confines of national boundaries, and a small,
but growing fraction of norms and rules governing relations among social actors of
all types (states, international agencies, firms, and of civil society) are based in and
pursued through transnational channels and processes.’’
Consequently, we define this emerging space of interactions, the related norms and rules
and the resulting roles and responsibilities of actors within the field of climate change as a
transnational arena of climate governance. The next section will explore this analytical
space in more detail.
3 Remapping transnational climate governance
In contrast to a majority of scholars and policy makers who view global climate gover-
nance as predominantly determined by the authority of states, we argue for a
conceptualization that is comprehensive enough to cover various ways in which authority
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is being articulated in relation to the climate issue.8 One helpful approach is to distinguish
between the source of authority and the mode of steering involved. Bo¨rzel and Risse (2005)
propose a continuum of public, hybrid and private sources of authority on the constellation-
axis and a continuum of hierarchical and non-hierarchical steering modes on the gover-
nance-axis. We can further distinguish these modes of governance into hierarchical top-
down regulation, and non-hierarchical governance through markets and networks (cf.
Mayntz 2004). In this respect, we understand approaches of global climate governance to
be situated along a continuum ranging from international and public sources of authority to
public–private or private interventions. Some are related to international agreements and
norms and thus fall under a shadow of hierarchy (e.g. the European Emissions Trading
Scheme), while others are situated in the realm of non-hierarchical steering without any
overarching authority. For the purpose of this article, we focus on those approaches,
policies and institutions that are situated beyond the purely international policy arena and
thus constitute the emerging, and in many instances contested, arena of transnational
climate governance. We provide examples of governance through markets and networks
for public, hybrid and purely private sources of authority in Table 1.
In order to analyse this emerging arena, we draw on two concepts that help to assess the
contribution of transnational climate policies to effectively address global climate change.
First, the concept of agency beyond the state that focuses on the actor-dimension and the
source of authority (horizontal axis), and second, the concept of architecture that high-
lights the generic governance principles, the institutional design and the institutional
interlinkages of different modes of governance within and across issue areas (vertical
axis).9
The concept of agency beyond the state is useful in analyzing the contributions—
positive as well as negative—of different actors to the problem of anthropogenic climate
change.10 In our reading, agency, understood as the capacity of individual and collective
Table 1 Sites of global climate governance
Mode of
Governance
Authority
Public Hybrid Private
Hierarchical National policy;
supra-national
organization
Market EU ETS (shadow
of hierarchy)
Compliance market in carbon
(CDM)
Carbon neutrality; company- and
industry-wide emission
trading
Networks C40; Cities for
Climate
Protection
Campaign
WSSD partnerships (e.g. Renewable
Energy and Energy Efficiency
Partnership)
CSR and business-NGO self-
regulation (e.g. Carbon
Disclosure Project)
Adapted from Bo¨rzel and Risse (2005)
8 For alternative approaches towards remapping the current arena of global climate governance, see An-
donova et al. (2007); Okereke and Bulkeley (2007). For a theoretical discussion of authority and democratic
legitimacy in the transnational realm, see Dingwerth (2005, 2007).
9 In contrast to the modes of governance, architecture and agency are analytical concepts to understand how
the different steering modes are situated within the larger architecture of climate governance and how
authority within that architecture is constructed.
10 For a further elaboration of the concept of agency beyond the state, see Biermann (2007).
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actors to change the course of events or the outcome of processes, is increasingly located in
sites beyond the state and its international organizations. A number of actors deliberately
form social institutions to address the problem of climate change without being forced,
persuaded or funded by states and other public agencies. To limit our analysis, we exclude
agency that is unconscious about itself (e.g. the unintended consequences of everyday
activities), but include individual agency, as in the case of carbon neutrality.
The second analytical concept that we apply to the emerging transnational arena of
global climate governance is architecture. According to Biermann (2007), architecture is
defined as ‘‘the interlocking web of principles, institutions and practices that shape deci-
sions by stakeholders at all levels’’. Most research has hitherto been focused on single
institutions. As a result, we today possess a fairly good understanding of the determinants
of institutional effectiveness (cf. Miles et al. 2001; Victor et al. 1998). In comparison,
however, the effectiveness of the overall institutional structure remains much less
understood.
With regard to approaches that fall within our concept of transnational climate gover-
nance, an analytical distinction can be made between those that are still connected to and/
or embedded in the international climate governance arena and those that predominantly
emanate from private authority and are directed to private actors. The next sections will
provide an empirical remapping of the current transnational climate governance arena,
including both hybrid and private markets as well as public, hybrid and private networks.
3.1 Transnational climate governance through markets
With the successful negotiation and entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, market
mechanisms have become a cornerstone of the current climate governance architecture.
The following sections discuss the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as an example
of hybrid authority and the concept of carbon neutrality as well as company- and industry-
wide emissions trading schemes as illustrations of private authority in transnational climate
governance.11
3.1.1 The clean development mechanism: carbon commodification?
The main trend in climate change governance since the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol
(1997) has been the process of carbon commodification, i.e. the turning of carbon dioxide
emissions reduction into commodities that can be bought and sold in a market. Markets for
emissions reduction do not emerge spontaneously but have to be crafted by political
decisions. The Clean Development Mechanism entered late in the Kyoto negotiations as
part of three ‘flexible mechanisms’ that were supposed to make the provisions more
agreeable to the U.S. As it turned out, the U.S. did not ratify the Protocol but the CDM has
nonetheless been established as an important mode and node of climate governance. The
CDM aims at providing low-cost emissions reductions to Annex 1 countries (developed
countries with binding emission targets under the Kyoto protocol), while at the same time
facilitating technology transfer, increasing the flow of capital from rich to poor countries,
and providing sustainable development in developing countries. In simple terms, the CDM
works ‘‘by paying developing countries to adopt lower-polluting technologies than they
11 We exclude the European Emissions Trading Scheme from our discussion, because it operates under a
considerable shadow of hierarchy and therefore does not comply with our conceptualization of transnational
climate governance.
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otherwise would’’ (Wara 2007, p. 595). Its relative success or failure depends on where you
look.
As a market, CDM seems to be (after a slow start) able to provide significant volumes of
emissions reduction for the carbon market. In May 2008, there were 3,498 CDM projects
under validation and registration in the CDM project Pipeline (UNEP 2008). In 2007, 551
MtCO2e
12 for a value of 4,787 million Euros were transacted in the CDM market (Capoor
and Ambrosi 2008). The CDM seems to deliver comparatively cost-effective reductions,
but research suggests that neither does it deliver sustainable development (Rowlands 2001;
Cosbey et al. 2006; Schneider 2007) nor does it contribute to investments in new infra-
structure and technology (Ellis et al. 2007; Pearson 2007). This point is underlined in a
large literature review of CDM and sustainable development: ‘‘the initial assumption of the
synergy and win-win relationship between the dual aims of the CDM does not hold for
many projects studied in the literature’’ (Olsen 2007, p. 64). However, since the market
share of renewable energy, fuel switching and energy efficiency projects have risen from
14% in 2005 to 64% in 2007, the potential for a contribution to sustainable development
has increased.
Overall, climate governance through the CDM is unevenly spread across the globe.
Three countries (China, India and Brazil) account for two-thirds of the projects and, as
regions, Latin America and the Asia and Pacific region host 96% of the projects. Africa has
earlier been bypassed in the CDM investments flows, but has now somewhat risen to hold
a market share of 5% of transacted volumes of Certified Emission Reduction (CER) even
though the number of projects (74) is still rather low. To some observers, geographically
unbalanced climate governance can be remedied through institutional redesign (Haites and
Yamin 2000), through stricter interpretation of additionality (Hamwey 1998) or through
different kinds of locally sensitive projects that connect to rural development strategies
(Boyd et al. 2007). To other observers, redesign, stricter rules or new projects will not
work as the CDM is fundamentally flawed. CDM is, in this perspective, a kind of new
‘carbon colonialism’ that only serve to legitimize rich countries’ overconsumption of the
world’s resources (Bachram 2004).
The CDM is principally interesting because it exemplifies a broader contemporary turn
in environmental policymaking towards market liberalism, flexibility and pluralism. The
governance of the CDM involves agency beyond the state at different political levels and
across various jurisdictions. Authority is delegated to a range of non-nation state actors and
their responsibilities diverge in every step of the CDM project cycle, from project iden-
tification and design to validation, registration, monitoring and over to verification and
certification, and, finally, to the issuance of CERs. The supreme authority over the CDM is
shared among governments in the CDM Executive Board (EB) and difficult issues are
negotiated and resolved under the climate convention. The EB is responsible for approval
and registration of CDM projects, the issuance of CERs, and the accreditation of the
‘Designated Operational Entities’ (DOEs), which are independent third-party private actors
involved in the validation and verification of CDM projects. At the national level, the
Designated National Authority (DNA) is an entity governments are required to set up to
approve potential CDM projects. Annex B governments are also involved in the CDM
project cycle as investors and project initiators and host-country governments may also
develop CDM projects on a unilateral basis. The private sector involves different types of
actors such as CDM project proponents, consultants (that identify and design CDM
12 MtCO2e stands for ‘‘million tones of carbon dioxide equivalent’’. This is the standard measurement of the
amount of CO2 emissions that are reduced or secluded from the environment.
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projects, take care of documentation in relation to baseline and monitoring methodologies),
carbon brokers (involved in the sale of CERs), carbon investment funds (bridge between
sellers and buyers of CERs), and, importantly, DOEs. Multilateral organizations (such as
the World Bank, UNIDO, UNDP, UNEP) appear frequently in CDM governance in various
roles (e.g. providing technical advisory, capacity assistance, research/scientific advice and
project finance). International organizations also set up carbon investment funds and
purchase CERs on behalf of governments and corporations. It is likely that the roles and
responsibilities of public and private actors in the CDM (or some similar market mecha-
nism for sustainable development) will change when a new post-2012 climate governance
architecture is agreed upon.
3.1.2 Voluntary carbon markets: The concept of carbon neutrality and corporate
emissions trading
In 2006, Oxford University Press announced ‘‘carbon neutrality’’ to be the word of the
year.13 A well-deserved award, as the concept had received a lot of media attention when,
for example, Coldplay in 2002 announced that they would plant 10,000 mango trees in
southern India to offset the environmental impacts of their second album. The Rolling
Stones claimed their tour in 2003 to be carbon neutral, and in 2004, one of the world’s
largest banks, HSBC, became the first carbon neutral bank. Even the FIFA World Cup
2006 was announced as a carbon neutral event. ‘Carbon Neutrality’ refers to companies
and individuals who ‘offset’ their carbon emissions by buying carbon credits that equal out
their contribution to climate change. It is important to note that carbon offsetting can be
carried out in two different ways that follow slightly different logics. One way is to buy
emissions rights in a cap-and-trade market (such as the EU ETS) that, in theory, raise the
price and hence reduce the demand for carbon. Whether the price actually rises depends on
whether the buyer is in a position to influence the market. The other way follows the logic
of the CDM and Joint Implementation, where carbon credits are generated through a
certain project. The project could either remove emissions from the atmosphere (such as
tree-planting projects) or reduce emissions indirectly (for example through fuel switching)
when compared to a business as usual projection.
The last years have seen an explosion in carbon offset retailers that made a publication
like ‘‘A Consumers Guide to Retail Carbon-Offset Providers’’ (2006) necessary. On the
demand side, every week we can witness new entities (for example governments, travel
magazines, airline companies, university departments) announcing their engagement in the
voluntary market. Usually, the demand is to offset a certain activity but the trend is also
spreading to products and services. In media, comments about this development range
from ‘‘The Good, The Bad, The Ugly’’ (Brainard 2007). It is common to point at carbon
offsetting as a modern form of selling indulgences that do not induce changes in lifestyles
(Monbiot 2006; Revkin 2007). Debates have also drawn attention to the dubious quality of
the offered offsets and to the lack of common standards (Robbins 2006; Harvey and Fidler
2007). Within a critical international political economy perspective, Larry Lohmann
(2006) offers a comprehensive account of carbon offsetting as a new arena of conflict and
contestation. In the same vein, the report ‘‘The Carbon Neutral Myth: Offset Indulgences
13 For an excellent summary of the discursive practices around climate governance beyond the state, see
Ba¨ckstrand and Lo¨vbrand (2006).
376 P. Pattberg, J. Stripple
123
for your Climate Sins’’ by Carbon Trade Watch (Smith 2007) includes case studies of the
Carbon Neutral Company (formerly known as Future Forests) and of a few different
offsetting projects. It also adds an analysis of how celebrity endorsements have helped to
legitimize such projects.
The recent emergence of a voluntary carbon market with the potential to ‘‘offset’’
emissions is a relevant development within the larger context of climate change mitigation,
but research has, so far, been lagging behind. Most research has focused on the ‘compli-
ance’ or ‘regulatory’ market, where the demand is generated by legally mandated
reductions. This part of the carbon market includes the Kyoto markets, the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme, the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the Australian New
South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme. It might therefore be indicative that at
Point Carbon’s 2007 ‘‘Carbon Market Insight’’ conference in Copenhagen, the voluntary
carbon market was for the first time included in the conference agenda with a well-attended
roundtable on ‘‘Voluntary Carbon Offsets’’.
As the voluntary carbon market is in an early stage of development, it is difficult to
estimate its current size. The World Bank study ‘‘State and Trends of the Carbon Market’’
(Capoor and Ambrosi 2007) estimate the volumes and values to 65 million Verified
Emissions Reductions for €246 million including trades on the Chicago Climate Exchange.
It is difficult to make a good estimation since there are no comprehensive registries of the
transactions made. Hence, estimations of future trends are more uncertain, but one might
still want to note that the U.S. analyst Trexler imagines the U.S. market to double every
year from, perhaps, 20MtCO2 in 2006 to 250 MtCO2 by 2011 (Trexler 2007).
While carbon credits produced by CDM/JI under the Kyoto Protocol are intergovern-
mentally regulated and supervised, and therefore include third-party verification and
transparency in a structured process, the voluntary carbon market is not regulated, emis-
sions reductions are not necessarily ‘certified’, the actors are not ‘accredited’, and there are
many different verification standards competing for attention.14 Many individuals and
institutional actors in the carbon market are currently working on developing the ‘Vol-
untary Carbon Standard’ (VCS), which aims to set a basic quality threshold. The VCS is
backed by The Climate Group, the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA)
and the World Economic Forum Global Greenhouse Register and might therefore hold the
potential for success. Capoor and Ambrosi (2007, 36) refer to the voluntary carbon market
as a wide-open space in urgent need for standards, but it remains to be seen how those
standards not only draw on existing CDM practices, but also accommodate the specific
characteristics of the voluntary carbon market.
In addition to the voluntary carbon market as a baseline and credit system, private
mitigation projects have also emerged within the corporate world. One remarkable trend is
the emergence and consolidation of different voluntary CO2 emissions reduction pro-
grammes put forward by individual companies. For example, more than 100 U.S.
corporations, among them leading companies such as Procter & Gamble, Coca-Cola,
DuPont and Alcoa, have set or already achieved voluntary targets (Vogel 2005). Next to
these firm-based initiatives, there are a number of network arrangements that incorporate a
number of companies. Among others, Environmental Defense and the World Wide Fund
for Nature (WWF) have both teamed up with corporations to set up voluntary targets for
emissions reduction that are independently monitored. In addition, a number of individual
14 Appendix 3 in Bayon et al. (2007) offers a recent overview of the various standards.
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companies have adopted and experimented with internal trading systems. The logic behind
these actions could be described as follows: first and foremost, companies prepare for a
political change in the U.S. that could lead to a more positive stance on binding emissions
reduction. Second, companies have, although to different degrees, experienced consider-
able monetary implications of voluntary reduction programmes. Vogel (2005, 130) reports
that Alcoa alone has reduced costs of about US $100 million annually through reduced
energy use and related environmental performance improvements.
Furthermore, private actors in cooperation with municipalities, public universities and
states have developed the first U.S.-based voluntary but legally binding emissions trading
scheme, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). Participating members have agreed to
reduce their global greenhouse gas emissions 4% (1% per year) below an annual baseline
emission average of the years 1998–2001. In the second commitment period from 2007 to
2010, reductions will be 6%. Members trade ‘carbon financial instruments’ (equal to
100 tons of carbon dioxide) that have been allocated according to their current emissions
and the baseline scenario. Participants that exceed their emissions allowance can buy
carbon financial instruments from those participants that are in excess of reductions. The
programme-wide emissions baseline has dropped from 250,761,100 metric tons of CO2 in
2004 to 226,510,000 in 2005. However, a number of criticisms have been raised against the
CCX. First, the annual emissions reduction of 1% is not very ambitious. Many companies
are expected to reach this reduction with just some cosmetic changes to their operations. A
second criticism is related to the market-based nature of a carbon-trading programme. The
financial incentive to avoid an excess of the individual carbon allowance will increase with
the market price for carbon financial instruments. With a market price of around US $3.30
in January 2007, the economic steering effect of the CCX is rather limited. Despite these
shortcomings, carbon trading is getting more institutionalized globally. Next to the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme, CCX has opened a European branch. In addition, recent
attempts by the International Emissions Trading Association to standardize the verification
of carbon reduction units (IETA 2006) underline the growing importance of private
market-building approaches.
From our perspective, the voluntary carbon market is a site of climate governance
beyond the state. The current search for common standards, registries and reporting pro-
cedures indicates a trend towards the institutionalization of climate governance beyond the
international negotiation routine. The emerging norm of ‘carbon neutrality’ is currently
expressed and contested not only on the carbon market, but also among the media, NGOs
and local communities. Hence, carbon neutrality and the ensuing practices of carbon
offsetting can be viewed as a policy instrument not just ‘beyond the state’, but within a
transnational public sphere with the potential to mitigate climate change largely inde-
pendent of state action.
3.2 Transnational climate governance through networks
Next to governing through markets, networks have emerged as a central steering mecha-
nism in global environmental governance. This section provides a mapping of networks
within the transnational arena of global climate governance, including public non-state
networks such as the C40 global cities partnership, hybrid networks emanating from
public–private sources of authority such as the WSSD partnerships, and finally networks
whose authority derives from purely private sources, such as corporate social responsibility
and standard-setting initiatives.
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3.2.1 Public non-state networks in transnational climate governance: the case of global
city partnerships
Next to public–private and private networks, the cooperation of public non-state actors
gains relevance in global climate governance. Cities are a prime example of public
authority that transcends the dichotomy of national/international (Bulkeley and Betsill
2003). Increasingly, cities have formed cooperative arrangements to exchange information,
learn from best practices and consequently mitigate carbon dioxide emissions indepen-
dently from national government decisions. These developments are interesting from both
the agency and architecture perspective. In terms of agency, city networks illustrate that the
drivers of climate policies can no longer be equated with governments and their diplomatic
corps, but have diversified to include the local as a central level of climate governance. In
terms of architecture, city networks for climate change mitigation add a crucial layer to the
complexity of global climate governance, as their individual contributions to problem
solving can no longer be subsumed under national commitments taken by states within the
UNFCCC/Kyoto framework. We discuss these aspects briefly below.
A prime example of a public non-state network in global climate governance is the
Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) programme organized by Local Governments for
Sustainability (ICLEI), an international association of local governments and national and
regional local government organizations that have made a commitment to sustainable
development. ICLEI began working on the issue of global climate change in 1991, when it
launched the Urban CO2 Reduction Project, involving 14 municipalities in North America
and Europe. This campaign, which ran until 1993, was designed to ‘‘develop compre-
hensive local strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and quantification methods to
support such strategies’’ (ICLEI 1997, p. 5).
On the basis of the success of the Urban CO2 Reduction Project, ICLEI launched its
CCP campaign in 1993 at the Municipal Leaders’ Summit on Climate Change and the
Urban Environment held at the United Nations (cf. Betsill 2001, p. 395). Any municipal
government is able to join Cities for Climate Protection by becoming a formal signatory to
a National Municipal Leaders’ Declaration on Climate Change. In 2008, 692 communities
in 31 countries are CCP members, with a clear bias towards Australia (196), the USA
(159), and Canada (109). It is estimated that CCP members account for approximately 15%
of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.15
The CCP programme has three main goals: quantifiable reductions in local greenhouse
gas emissions, improvement of air quality, and the enhancement of urban livability and
sustainability. In achieving these goals, the CCP programme is premised on the assumption
that while the efforts of any single local government to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
may be relatively modest, by working together local authorities can make a significant
contribution to the efforts to mitigate climate change (Betsill 2004, p. 477). Participation in
the CCP programme includes a number of defined steps. First, interested local governments
begin participating in the CCP programme by passing a resolution pledging to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions from their local government operations and throughout their
communities. Each local government sets its own emission reduction target and develops a
Local Action Plan outlining actions that the city will pursue to meet its target. After
passing the resolution, the local government designates a staff member and an elected
official to serve as the city’s liaison to ICLEI.
15 For more information about CCP membership, see http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=800, retrieved June
19, 2008.
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The approach through which the CCP’s goals are expected to be reached is the so-called
5 milestones approach to which members commit themselves in an attempt to control GHG
emissions. It consists of the following elements: (1) conduct a baseline emissions inventory
and forecast; (2) adopt an emissions reduction target for the forecast year; (3) develop a
Local Action Plan through a multi-stakeholder process (most plans also incorporate public
awareness and education efforts); (4) implement policies and measures (e.g. energy effi-
ciency improvements to municipal buildings and water treatment facilities, streetlight
retrofits, public transit improvements, installation of renewable power applications, and
methane recovery from waste management); and finally (5) monitor and verify results.
Tangible results of this approach are difficult to verify. ICLEI itself estimates that the U.S.-
based CCP participants mitigate approximately 23 million tons of carbon dioxide annually
(ICLEI 2006). Scholars have thus emphasized the ‘soft’ results of the CCP, such as
increased access to relevant technical information and policy learning (Betsill 2004,
p. 487).
A second example of a public non-state network in transnational climate governance is
the C40 network. In August 2006, the Large Cities Climate Leadership Group, a coalition
of then 18 global cities, was joined by the Clinton Climate Initiative to form the C40, a
partnership of 40 major cities that have pledged to reduce carbon emissions and increase
energy efficiency in large cities across the world. In the words of Nicholas Stern, economic
advisor to the UK government: ‘‘The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group is a tremen-
dous idea and a fine example of the different dimensions of international collaboration’’
(C40 2008). Despite such praise, the C40 initiative is in such an early stage of its
implementation that an evaluation of its performance and impacts is currently not feasible.
Taken together, the CCP programme and the C40 initiative illustrate our claim that con-
temporary climate governance cannot adequately be analysed from a purely international
perspective, but has to take into account the multiple spheres of authority emerging in
global climate governance today.
3.2.2 Public–private networks in transnational climate governance:
the case of WSSD partnerships for sustainable development
Public–private partnerships, that is networks of different societal actors, including gov-
ernments, international agencies, corporations, research institutions and civil society
organizations, have become a cornerstone of the current global environmental order, both
in discursive and material terms. At the UN level, partnerships have been endorsed by the
former Secretary General Kofi Anan through the establishment of the Global Compact, a
voluntary partnership between corporations and the United Nations, as well as through the
so-called type-2 agreement concluded by governments at the World Summit for Sustain-
able Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002 that institutionalizes public–private
implementation partnerships in issues areas ranging from biodiversity to energy and has
been criticized for effectively privatizing parts of the policy responses to global change.
These networks typically bring together actors from various sectors—governments,
industry, activists, scientists or international organizations—and build on a voluntary
agreement to achieve a specific sustainability goal, in other words govern a distinct issue
area. They are defined as ‘‘specific commitments by various partners intended to contribute
to and reinforce the implementation of the outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations of
the WSSD (Programme of Action and the Political Declaration) and to help the further
implementation of Agenda 21 and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)’’ (Kara
and Quarless 2002). The United Nations invited such partnerships to register with the
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secretariat of the Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD), a sub-committee of the
UN Economic and Social Council. By March 2007, 323 multi-stakeholder initiatives have
been listed in the CSD Partnerships Database.16
Out of the 323 WSSD partnerships formally registered, 96 are within the primary
categories of ‘‘energy for sustainable development’’, ‘‘air pollution/atmosphere’’ and
‘‘climate change’’.17 What is missing so far is an encompassing assessment of the effec-
tiveness of these novel mechanisms of governance with regard to the ultimate objective of
the climate change convention as defined in UNFCCC Article 2 and other international
documents.
For the purpose of this article, we focus on some less ambitious and more descriptive
questions in regard to the 27 partnerships that focus on climate change as their primary
thematic area. First, what is the geographical scope of climate change partnerships?
Second, what is the average duration of partnerships in this issue area? And third, is the
climate change area dominated by one specific type of partner? To answer these questions,
we draw on data collected for the Global Sustainability Partnerships Database (cf. Bier-
mann et al. 2007a, b; but see also Ba¨ckstrand 2008).
With regard to the geographical scope of WSSD partnerships in the thematic area of
climate change, the lack of local and national scope is noteworthy (see Table 2). As one
might expect given the global nature of the climate problem, globally geared partnerships
are very frequent, performing above average (63%) compared to the total partnership
sample (50.8%). However, given the high importance of adaptation within the climate
change issue area and the immediate relevance of sustainability at the local level, the total
absence of local partnerships from the climate sample is surprising. In fact, it underlines
the frequently raised criticism that WSSD partnerships reflect given interest structures and
therefore seldom deliver additional benefits that have not already been realized in more
traditional multilateral or bilateral implementation programmes.
A second interesting observation relates to the average duration of WSSD climate
change partnerships. Given the long-term effects of climate change and the given inertia of
the climate system, it seems at least plausible to assume that partnerships in the area of
climate change will either be frequently open-ended or long term. In fact, our assessment
of the available data shows that 37% of all climate change partnerships are open-ended,
compared to 28.3% in the total sample. In addition, the average duration compares 6.1–
4.9 years in favour of climate partnerships. We can tentatively conclude that climate
change partnerships within the context of WSSD reflect the specific long-term nature of the
climate problem in their duration. However, it is unclear whether the observed duration
Table 2 Geographical scope
of WSSD partnerships
All WSSD (%) Climate change (%)
Global 50.8 63.0
Local 0.9 0.0
National 4.7 3.7
Regional 19.6 14.8
Subregional 24.0 18.5
16 See http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/welcome.do, retrieved 5 October, 2007.
17 Note that these categories are based on the self-description of partnerships in the CSD partnership
database.
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pattern is adequate in achieving the partnership goals and thereby contributing to, at least
partially, solving the climate change problem.
Turning to the question of leadership within our climate change sample, three obser-
vations are noteworthy.18 First, leadership by UN agencies is less frequent in the climate
change sample than in the total (12.1% compared to 16.7%), while state leadership is
above average at 33.3 compared to 24.4%. This finding is consistent with the argument that
the politically sensitive area of climate change is less likely to be governed by international
agencies but is expected to remain under the control of governments. As a second
observation, business actors are slightly overrepresented in the climate change sample
(6.1% compared to 2.6%), but are still less frequently found in leadership roles than
standard arguments about business interests in climate change might suggest. One
explanation could be that the advantages of participation in partnerships as a lead-partner
do not outweigh the costs and therefore business actors remain either absent or participate
in less prominent roles. However, as the participation rate for business is higher than in the
total sample, a business case for climate change might well exist. This observation is in
line with the growing relevance of specific business interests in climate change, such as
insurance, investors and consultancy firms. Finally, research institutions are underrepre-
sented in climate change partnerships (3% compared to 11.8%), which is surprising in so
far as science plays a major role in defining the problem of climate change as well as in
finding solutions.
In sum, our preliminary assessment of climate change partnerships within the sample of
WSSD partnerships has pointed to a number of open questions, in particular with regard to
the effectiveness of public–private approaches. For example: Does the average duration of
climate change partnerships adequately reflect the nature of the climate system? Is
effective implementation of climate-related activities possible without a major contribution
by business actors (both in terms of making an actual impact and in terms of providing
additional financial resources)? Or, how can we explain the lack of local-level partnerships
in an issue area where, at least rhetorically, high emphasis is placed on delivering sus-
tainable development to local communities?
3.2.3 Private networks in transnational climate governance: the case of corporate social
responsibility
In addition to public–private networks that are still embedded within the larger multilateral
arena, at least partially, there are a number of policies that are beyond the state in a more
concrete sense, as their authority does not predominantly emanate from, or address public
actors. Instead, they target transnational corporations and their global value and supply
chains. Consequently, the majority of these approaches are discussed under the heading of
corporate social responsibility (CSR), understood as ‘‘a concept whereby companies
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their
interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’’ (Commission of the European
Communities 2001, p. 6).
Next to firm- or industry-level emissions reduction schemes and market-building
approaches, a number of private networks have emerged that only indirectly aim at
greenhouse gas emissions reduction, but rather focus on creating the necessary information
and transparency for societal actors to assess corporate responses to climate change.
18 Leadership refers to the question of who is formally (by registration with the CSD database) a lead-
partner within a partnership. Note that multiple lead-partners per partnership are possible.
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Consequently, these benchmarking processes create a global competition among business
actors to address climate change as a serious limitation to their profit-making activities.
These emerging information-based governance schemes effectively institutionalize new
norms at the transnational level, for example the norm to disclose corporate carbon
emissions (in addition to the country-based reporting of the UNFCCC). We discuss the
Carbon Disclosure Project as an illustrative example.19
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) provides an institutional setting for the world’s
largest collaboration of institutional investors on the business implications of climate
change. CDP represents an efficient process whereby many institutional investors collec-
tively sign a single global request for disclosure of information on greenhouse gas
emissions. In 2007, 225 investment firms, representing over 31 trillion $US, are CDP
supporters. In 2006, CDP has asked the FT 500 (the 500 largest firms by market capital-
ization) the fourth time in a row to disclose their carbon emissions and emissions reduction
approaches along with information about climate change-related management strategies
and participation in emissions trading (CDP 2006). After 47, 59, and 71% in the three
preceding surveys, 72% have responded to CPD 4 in 2006. Interestingly, sectors that have
a high impact on carbon emission, such as the electric utility sector, have performed above
average in the FT 500 index as a whole, while, not surprisingly, US companies are lagging
behind European companies (60% compared to 82%). In addition to the regular survey,
more than 1,000 large corporations report on their emissions through the CDP’s website.
Although it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the CDP and the wider carbon
disclosure discourse, arguably institutional investors have acquired agency beyond the
state in global climate governance by, at least partially, institutionalizing the norm of
corporate disclosure of carbon emissions and carbon reductions.20
In addition to the complexity of agency, the architecture of global climate governance is
highly fragmented. Within the private realm of climate governance, a number of
approaches exist that have no link to the international arena and therefore can hardly be
integrated in or at least synchronized with the ongoing post-2012 negotiations. However, a
number of interlinkages are also visible. Being the most obvious case, companies have
related their firm- or industry-level emissions reduction programmes to the international
targets and timetables approach of the Kyoto Protocol. Less obvious, but no less important,
the business-NGO partnership The Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA)
has recently announced the first two forestry projects to be independently certified under its
Climate, Community & Biodiversity (CCB) Standards.21 The standard evaluates land-
based carbon mitigation projects in forestry and thereby relates to the so-called land use,
land use change and forestry section of the Kyoto Protocol.22 On this account, private
standardization attempts to fill critical gaps in the operationalization and implementation of
international agreements.
19 Another emerging non-state information-based governance scheme is the Investor Network on Climate
Risk, organized by the non-profit organization ‘Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies’, an
institutionalized cooperation of leading US environmental organizations, social responsible investors and
companies.
20 For a general assessment of the influence of transnational CSR schemes, see Pattberg (2006).
21 See www.climate-standards.org.
22 Under Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol, Parties decided that greenhouse gas removals and emissions
through certain activities—namely, afforestation and reforestation since 1990—are accounted for in
meeting the Kyoto Protocol’s emission targets.
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In sum, the current developments in CSR clearly underscore the relevance of a
broadened analytical perspective on global climate change governance. With an increasing
number of non-state actors acquiring agency beyond the state and the deepening institu-
tionalization of non-state approaches towards climate change such as market- and
information-based mechanisms, a strictly international and state-centered perspective
seems no longer viable. Instead, focusing on the transnational global climate governance
arena shows the importance of CSR for effective climate politics.
4 Conclusions
In this article we have argued for a fresh perspective on current global climate governance.
In particular, we believe a new conceptualization of global climate governance is essential
in order to understand the increasing complexity, segmentation and functional differenti-
ation of climate politics. Our notion of a transnational arena of climate governance offers
such a concept and opens up space for remapping key sites of public, hybrid and private
authority over the climate issue. Following a vibrant debate about the inadequacy of the
public/private dichotomy in political theory and the recent trend towards a multi-actor and
multi-level perspective in the discipline of IR, we suggest to position the emergent arena of
transnational climate governance within a larger shift towards a global public domain.
In short, our article reflects two major purposes, one conceptual and one empirical. First,
we aimed to develop a better conceptual vantage point to analyse the potential problem-
solving contributions of different non-state actors and institutions (including a critical
perspective on the normative implications of such a development). In light of a growing
complexity of global climate policy, we believe that an expansion of our analytical toolkit
is both necessary and rewarding. We argue that next to the international arena of global
climate governance consisting of states and public agencies, there is an increasingly
institutionalized arena of transnational global climate governance. What is missing to date
is a detailed assessment of agency beyond the state in regard to the institutional
arrangements different actors create and sustain in order to address the problem of climate
change and the resulting overarching architecture of climate governance. Consequently, as
our second purpose, we attempt to provide an up-to-date empirical account of the bur-
geoning field of transnational climate governance and a critical assessment of its problem-
solving capacity.
With regard to the former objective, we have provided a broader perspective on global
climate governance that takes into account public, hybrid and private sources of authority.
We have provided an overview of central empirical developments in the field, with a focus
on those that are still linked to the international arena (e.g. the partnerships that have
emerged from the 2002 Johannesburg Summit) and those that operate in greater distance
from the established field of international politics, such as the carbon neutrality approach.
In sum, our empirical analysis has highlighted some important aspects: first, transna-
tional approaches towards global climate change governance might increase the
transparency of the system, for example through initiatives like the Carbon Disclosure
Project. Second, transnational approaches provide a clear signal to the political system of
national governments and international organizations that climate change features high on
the global agenda. Third, public–private partnerships, such as the WSSD partnerships and
the CDM, have displayed rather mixed results. And finally, Carbon Neutrality emerges as
novel discourse in global climate governance that potentially shifts the agency from public
actors such as states to individuals.
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Concluding from our empirical analysis, we want to bring forward some preliminary
critical observations. First, the frequent interlinkages within the transnational arena (e.g.
between CSR initiatives and carbon neutrality) and beyond (e.g. the link between carbon
neutrality and the carbon market) make the overall system more complex. This offers more
possibilities for issues-linkages and strategic bargains among actors (both governments and
non-state actors), but at the same time increases the need for coordination among a
growing number of agents in global climate governance. It remains to been seen how
higher degrees of coordination can be achieved in the absence of a centralized structure of
authority and before norms, rules and procedures are established and recognized by a large
part of the relevant actors. As a result, we need to further our knowledge about the systemic
interaction between the international and transnational global climate arena and the pos-
sibility for effective and equitable governance, taking into account a growing number of
agents in a multiplicity of institutional contexts. Second, as there is currently neither an
overall account of the mitigation commitments brought forward by a host of private actors
nor a trustworthy verification system for those commitments, the effectiveness of trans-
national climate mitigation instruments remains to be assessed. However, we believe that
our remapping exercise presented in this article can be a useful starting point for future
research on the role and relevance of transnational approaches to the global climate crisis.
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